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INTRODUCTION
The tax exemption for Internal Revenue Code ("Code")
§ 501 (c)(4) social welfare organizations dates back to the Revenue
Act of 1913, but it has never attracted much serious scholarly atten-
tion. Variously referred to as a "historical accident," "hodgepodge,"
"catch-all," "dumping ground,"1 and "default choice," § 501(c)(4) is
the home to at least 81,935 nonprofit organizations according to the
* Professor Emeritus, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Spe-
cial thanks are due to Harvey Dale and Jill Manny for organizing the 2017 annual
conference hosted by the National Center on Philanthropy and the Law at New York
University School of Law, and to the participants at the conference for their lively and
insightful discussion. Some of this commentary goes beyond what was presented at
the conference.
1. The term "dumping ground" has been attributed to various sources, including
this commentator who thought it was first used (by him) as part of an introduction to
social welfare organizations in an early edition of his co-authored casebook. See
JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, CASES AND MATERIALS: NONPROFIT ORGA-
NIZATIONS 581 (2d ed. 2000). In the most recent edition of the casebook, "dumping
ground" was changed to the less colorful "default choice." See JAMES J. FISHMAN,
STEPHEN SCHWARZ & LLOYD HITOSHI MAYER, CASES AND MATERIALS: NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS 846 (5th ed. 2015). It turns out that the RS may deserve credit for
"dumping ground," having used the term in I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,219 (Oct. 30,
1969), which quotes a 1966 internal study prepared by Chief Counsel and the Techni-
cal Division to help the Treasury Department better understand the meaning and scope
of § 501(c)(4). Thanks go to Doug Mancino for setting the historical record straight.
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latest available Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") data.2 As well de-
tailed elsewhere in this issue,3 § 501(c)(4) organizations are best
known for their increasingly significant role as a destination resort for
unlimited lobbying and, as long as it is not the organization's primary
purpose, political campaign activity. The conference for which the ar-
ticles and commentary in this symposium have been prepared shine
new light on the murky history of § 501(c)(4) and the multiplicity of
other roles that social welfare organizations have played over their
long history.
4
David Miller's illuminating article is a valuable contribution to
this contemporary dissection of § 501(c)(4), bringing out of the
shadows the emerging use of social welfare organizations as
grantmakers. 5 Miller's work has many of the attributes of an outstand-
ing conference paper. For practitioners, it serves as an authoritative
primer. For the entire audience, it is thought-provoking and raises im-
portant policy concerns. Most readers, even those who consider them-
selves experts in the field, will know more after reading the article
than they did before. This is no surprise coming from Miller, whose
range of expertise and perspective on the big picture is apparent from
an earlier paper in which he proposed a bold and mostly sensible radi-
cal reformation of the taxation of exempt organizations and their
patrons.
6
The commentator's task, however, is not just to host a testimonial
dinner but also to sharpen the discussion. To that end, with elaboration
to follow, I offer the following preliminary observations: (1) in dis-
cussing the use of § 501(c)(4) organizations as a grantmaking vehicle,
Miller's article understates and to some extent devalues other more
traditional and widely used alternatives; (2) the donors most likely to
benefit from using a domestic social welfare organization for
grantmaking appear to be a relatively small subset of wealthy individ-
2. INTERNAL REVENUF SERVICE (IRS) 2017 DATA BOOK 57 (2018).
3. See Roger Colinvaux, Social Welfare and Political Organizations: Ending the
Plague of Inconsistency, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 481 (2018); Rosemary E.
Fei & Eric K. Gorovitz, Practitioner Perspectives on Using § 501(c)(4) Organizations
for Charitable Lobbying: Realities and An Alternative, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
Poy'y 535 (2018).
4. See Ellen P. Aprill, Examining the Landscape of § 501(c)(4) Social Welfare
Organizations, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 345 (2018); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer,
A (Partial) Defense of § 501(c)(4)'s "Catchall" Nature, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
Po,'y 439 (2018).
5. See David S. Miller, Social Welfare Organizations as Grantmakers, 21 N.Y.U.
J. LEGIS. & PUB. Poi'y 413 (2018).
6. See David S. Miller, Reforming the Taxation of Exempt Organizations and
Their Patrons, 67 TAX LAW. 451 (2014).
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uals living in rarefied air who are indifferent to the charitable income
tax deduction and have an aversion to regulation and transparency; (3)
those who would opt to use a foreign social welfare organization re-
side in an even smaller gated community, requiring expensive and
highly specialized counsel to navigate through an imposing maze of
substantive and procedural rules; and (4) as for the policy implica-
tions, the use and potential abuse of § 501(c)(4) organizations as
grantmakers may not be a big problem because so few are affected, or
if this is an emerging trend, there may be a need for targeted reforms
that do not go quite as far as those proposed in the article.
I.
COMPARING OTHER GRANTMAKING ALTERNATIVES
To set the stage, Miller's article identifies the type of donor for
whom a § 501(c)(4) organization may be the ideal grantmaking
choice. Jeff Bezos, Warren Buffett, and Bill Gates are mentioned as
examples. Other names come to mind. These fortunate few are indi-
viduals with a huge capacity for giving and a willingness to do so.
Many are indifferent to the charitable income tax deduction because it
is not of great economic benefit to them. It is fairly well known, for
example, that the value of Warren Buffett's annual gifts of Berkshire
Hathaway stock to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is well in
excess of the applicable percentage limitation on his surprisingly small
adjusted gross income, and, in any event, Buffett's charitable deduc-
tion is probably limited to his very low basis in the stock.
7
Mega-donors such as Warren Buffett achieve a much greater ben-
efit from their ability to avoid realizing the enormous amounts of
built-in gain on the transfer of appreciated stock to a grantmaking en-
tity they legally or effectively control. Some of these great givers have
objectives that outweigh the potential tax benefits, such as flexibility
in grantmaking and investing, avoiding the excessive regulation im-
7. Warren Buffett revealed that in 2015 he made an annual donation of $2.8 billion
of Berkshire Hathaway stock but his adjusted gross income was a surprisingly low
$11.5 million. See Press Release, Berkshire Hathaway, Some Tax Facts for Donald
Trump (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20161010005859/
en/Tax-Facts-Donald-Trump. The percentage limitation for gifts of capital gain prop-
erty to a private foundation is 20 percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income.
I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(D)(i)(I) (2012). Mr. Buffett's charitable deduction also will be lim-
ited to the basis in the donated stock rather than its fair market value assuming, as
seems likely, that the size of his holdings and prior gifts disqualify him from deduct-
ing the full value using the "qualified appreciated stock" exception. I.R.C.
§§ 170(e)(1)(B)(ii), (e)(5).
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posed by the private foundation rules,8 and privacy. The incentives are
well described in the introduction to Miller's article. But how many
people are we talking about here? My guess: not many. And insofar as
this recipe to use § 501(c)(4) organizations for grantmaking is tailored
for and exploited by a very few, policy makers should consider
whether and how to curtail it.
The initial thesis of this commentary is that the vast majority of
donors, even those who do not benefit from the charitable deduction,
can achieve most, if not all, of their goals by using other, more con-
ventional, philanthropic vehicles. If the donors desire the flexibility to
do more, such as for-profit social investing or contributing to political
causes and candidates, they also have a combination of existing struc-
tures to do so. A brief survey of these alternatives reinforces the point.
The private foundation is the most traditional grantmaking vehi-
cle. Miller accurately recites the "long list" of restrictions, limitations,
and excise taxes on the private foundation in the Code and writes,
"[S]o onerous are these restrictions and limitations that while the
Gates Foundation welcomed Warren Buffett's gift, it discourages all
other donations." 9 This is a bit of a non sequitur. The private founda-
tion restrictions are probably not the major reason the Bill and Me-
linda Gates Foundation discourages gifts from other donors, large or
small. The Gates Foundation has plenty of philanthropic capital and
understandably prefers to focus on its many good projects and causes,
rather than diverting its energy and staff time to the "back office"
burden of accepting and acknowledging small gifts from donors who
would be better served by partnering with a compatible community
foundation.
The broader question is whether the private foundation rules are
such an impediment to Jeff Bezos, Bill Gates and Warren Buffett that
their advisers should steer them and their ilk toward § 501(c)(4) orga-
8. For a similar illustration of a donor's willingness to forego income, gift and
estate tax charitable deductions as a trade-off for avoiding the private foundation rules
otherwise applicable to charitable remainder trusts under § 4947(a)(2), see I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 2017-13-002 (Mar. 31, 2017) and I.R.S. Priv. Lr. Rul. 2017-13-003 (Mar.
31, 2017). One can speculate that the taxpayer's agenda in these curious rulings was
to defer realization of gain on the highly appreciated property contributed to the CRT
and then sold, and also avoid self-dealing penalties if that sale (or any later transac-
tions by the CRT) are with a "disqualified person," such as a related family member
or entity. The rulings direct the taxpayer to "keep good records" to prove that no
charitable deductions were ever taken.
9. Footnote 7 of Miller's article notes, however, that the Gates Foundation encour-
ages individuals to give directly to its grantees. To facilitate that process, it formed a
related public charity to disburse donor contributions that align with the foundation's
programmatic objectives.
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nizations for all their grantmaking. In most (maybe not all) cases, the
answer is no. When first enacted in 1969, it was feared that the excise
tax regime in §§ 4940 to 4945 of the Code threatened the future of
private foundations and would contribute to their demise. Panicky
lawyers advised clients to shut down their foundations and instead use
donor-advised funds at community foundations for their giving. After
an initial brief decline, however, private foundations flourished.' 0
They remain the entity of choice for most grantmakers, who have
learned to navigate the restrictions. Indeed, many of the private foun-
dation rules are consistent with fiduciary standards and best practices,
and they contribute to a disciplined governance process and responsi-
ble grantmaking. To be sure, there is occasional overkill, such as the
bright line self-dealing rules that punish even market rate transactions.
But with good counsel, private foundations can do most of what
grantmakers want to do (or should want to do), albeit with slightly
reduced income tax benefits, and all of this in bright sunlight and in
perpetuity, if so desired. Private foundations can influence the public
debate through education and robust advocacy, make grants to indi-
viduals and foreign charities, and, under recently liberalized regula-
tions, make program-related investments in for-profit businesses and
engage in other forms of impact investing. They remain under family
control after the founders die and can receive large bequests that qual-
ify for a 100% estate tax charitable deduction. What private founda-
tions cannot do is use their considerable resources to influence
political campaigns, facilitate the retention of control of a family busi-
ness, pay insiders more than they are worth (although some do and are
not caught), fail to make reasonable annual distributions for charitable
purposes, or avoid disclosing their donors, investments, and grants.
A second traditional grantmaking alternative is the § 509(a)(3)
supporting organization ("SO"). Supporting organizations avoid pri-
vate foundation status as long as they have the requisite relationship
with one or more supported public charities and meet certain other
technical requirements. The reward is that they are treated, for most
federal tax purposes, as public charities. The Pension Protection Act
of 2006 added a heavy layer of additional regulation, primarily to
what are known as non-functionally integrated "Type El1" SOs. 1 1 Be-
cause these grantmaking Type Ell SOs have a more attenuated rela-
tionship with the public charities they support and do not conduct their
10. See generally FISHMAN, SCHWARZ & MAYER, supra note 1, at 665-66.
11. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 509(f). For a definition of a "functionally integrated" Type III
SO, see I.R.C. § 4943(f)(5); all other types of Type III SOs are "non-functionally"
integrated.
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own programs, they were viewed as susceptible to abuse. Left rela-
tively untouched by the 2006 legislation were Type I SOs, a structure
akin to parent-subsidiary relationship where the supported public char-
ity has legal control through its power to appoint a majority of the
SO's governing board.
A Type I supporting organization legally controlled by a commu-
nity foundation with a broad grantmaking mission has become an at-
tractive option for a handful of very wealthy donors whose financial
profile makes a private foundation less desirable from a tax stand-
point. 1 2 Although the public charity must appoint a majority of the
governing board, these "independent" directors typically have prior
(often close) personal or professional relationships to the founding do-
nor. A notable example is the George Kaiser Family Foundation, a
Type I SO controlled by the Tulsa Community Foundation, which, as
of its last available Form 990, had approximately $3.2 billion in as-
sets. This foundation has a broad grantmaking mandate and makes a
relatively small direct contribution to its supported community foun-
dation. Many major community foundations, including some Jewish
federations, quietly control a few very large Type I supporting organi-
zations that engage in a broad range of grantmaking.
Donor-advised funds, a growth industry despite the modest new
regulatory regime added by the Pension Protection Act of 2006,13 also
have come to play a major grantmaking role, even for wealthy donors.
Among other things, donor-advised funds offer anonymity, for those
who want it; investment flexibility; administrative convenience; and
the ability to accept and hold complex assets, such as closely held
stock, real estate, and even cryptocurrency without reduced tax bene-
fits. Donor-advised funds also are not subject to a rigid annual payout
requirement (at least not yet). Anecdotal evidence suggests that a new
breed of younger philanthropists, many of whom derived their wealth
from successful tech companies, have established very large donor-
advised funds at community foundations. One only need to look at the
Silicon Valley Community Foundation, which announced in early
2018 that a surge of giving ($1.4 billion in new gifts were received in
12. Examples of impediments that may steer a donor from a private foundation to a
supporting organization are: (1) much less desirable tax benefits for gifts of low basis
closely held stock (I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(ii) limits the charitable deduction for such
gifts to private foundations to the donor's basis); (2) the excess business holdings
divestiture requirements (I.R.C. § 4943); and (3) the prospect of self-dealing penalties
on transactions with related persons even if they involve no insider economic benefit
(I.R.C. § 4941).
13. I.R.C. §§ 4966, 4967.
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2017) had increased its asset base to $13.5 billion) 4 ranking it ahead
of the Ford Foundation. More than ninety percent of the Silicon Val-
ley Community Foundation's assets are in donor-advised funds.
Finally, consider the "philanthropic" limited liability company
("LLC"), exemplified by the widely publicized Chan/Zuckerberg Initi-
ative. 15 This new kid on the Silicon Valley block has been misunder-
stood by many journalists and even some academic commentators.
When the Chan/Zuckerberg Initiative was first formed, it was greeted
with a combination of applause for the donors' generosity and cries of
outrage over lack of transparency or avoidance of the private founda-
tion restrictions. Of course, it was premature to call the Initiative phi-
lanthropy because, unlike what happens when a private foundation is
funded, the Initiative's founders had not yet parted with any of their
Facebook stock. (In fairness, Mr. Zuckerberg made several large do-
nations prior to forming the Initiative.) As used by Mr. Zuckerberg
and Dr. Chan and their Palo Alto neighbor, Laurene Powell Jobs, an
LLC is merely a flexible management structure to organize all or part
of their wealth more formally. The founders promise that, over time,
the LLC will engage in a variety of activities, including charitable
giving, investing in for-profit companies with a social mission, politi-
cal advocacy, and more, all of which they could have done directly
without the LLC wrapper. To his credit, Mr. Zuckerberg reportedly
has donated more than $1.75 billion of Facebook stock to a donor-
advised fund at the Silicon Valley Community Foundation,' 6 and in
2016 he contributed through his "CZI Holdings LLC" $1.15 billion of
14. Press Release, Silicon Valley Cmty. Found., SVCF Awards $1.3 Billion to
Nonprofit Organizations in 2017 (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.siliconvalleycf.org/
press-release-february-8-2018. The statement reported that seventeen percent of the
foundation's total investments (worth about $1.4 billion) were in publicly traded stock
in one unnamed company (likely Facebook). See Kathleen Pender, Silicon Valley
Community Foundation's Assets Surged in 2017. It Won't Say Why, S.F. CHRON.
(Feb. 23, 2018, 1:43 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/networth/article/
Silicon-Valley-Community-Foundation-s-assets- 12704936.php.
15. An LLC structure also is used by Laurene Powell Jobs through her Emerson
Collective. See EMERSON CoLLECTivE, http://emersoncollective.com (last visited Jan.
5, 2019). For an excellent discussion of the philanthropic LLC, see Dana Brakman
Reiser, Disruptive Philanthropy: Chan/Zuckerberg, the Limited Liability Company,
and the Millionaire Next Door (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies, Working Paper
No. 536, 2017), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3049021. See
also Dana Brakman Reiser, Sharon C. Lincoln & Ingrid Mittermaier, Using Non-
501(c)(3) Vehicles to Accomplish Philanthropic Objectives, TAXES, Dec. 2017, at 45.
16. See Kerry A. Dolan, Mark Zuckerberg-Connected Charity at Risk of Implosion,
FORBES (May 2, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kerryadolan/2018/
05/02/silicon-valley-community-foundation-emmett-carson/#7b l2c8615fOf, and see
supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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Facebook stock 17 to the Chan Zuckerberg Foundation, a private foun-
dation he formed several years earlier with nominal capital. Ms. Jobs
also fulfilled her promise in 2016, with complete transparency, when
she formed the Emerson Collective Foundation and funded it with a
contribution of $1.2 billion, of which $813.9 million was appreciated
stock of the Walt Disney Company.' 8
The single-member LLC structure employed by the Chan/Zuck-
erberg Initiative is a disregarded entity for tax purposes. It is not an
income or wealth transfer tax avoidance device or an end run around
the private foundation rules, and there is no urgent need to single it out
for special regulation under either federal tax or state nonprofit laws.
Instead, the LLC structure is, mostly, a "family office" by another
name, allowing its founders to centralize their investment, philan-
thropic, and other personal causes and pursuits; preserve and protect
control in their major business holdings while diversifying (or not);
employ a staff and pay them well (or not); keep good records; act as a
buffer between themselves and the horde of supplicants who want
them to part with their money; and more. An LLC may also facilitate
anonymous giving, or, as in Mr. Zuckerberg's case, market the
founder's brand by polishing a halo that may or may not be deserved.
Whether or not the LLC is worthy of being labelled "philanthropic"
depends on what it actually does, as opposed to what it aspires to do.
From this commentator's experience, well advised wealthy do-
nors and families often use several different traditional grantmaking
vehicles, with or without an LLC structure. Those with an en-
trepreneurial bent combine these tax-exempt vehicles with for-profit
entities to directly conduct social enterprises or engage in what has
become known as "impact investing." Donors seeking to influence the
political process can use § 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations for
lobbying and limited political campaign activity. Examples include the
Omidyar Network, formed by Pierre Omidyar, the founder of eBay, 19
and the Good Ventures and Open Philanthropy family of entities
17. In 2016, the Chan Zuckerberg Foundation sold a portion of the donated stock in
which it had a $67,245 basis for approximately $650 million, and the foundation paid
$6.5 million of tax (it qualified for the one percent rate under § 4940(e)) on the result-
ing capital gain and its other investment income. Chan Zuckerberg Foundation, 2016
Form 990-PF, Parts IV-VI (2017). This information and similar data on other organi-
zations reported in this commentary are derived from Form 990-PFs and, for public
charities, Form 990s posted on the GuideStar data base, https://www.guidestar.org.
18. Most of this stock was sold, generating a $490.7 capital gain and a $9.8 million
excise tax liability for the foundation under § 4940. Emerson Collective Foundation,
2016 Form 990-PF, Part IV (2017).
19. See Who We Are, OMIDYAR NETWORK, https://www.omidyar.com/who-we-are
(last visited Jan. 7. 2019).
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DOMESTIC SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS
AS GRANTMAKERS
Given the traditional philanthropic vehicles available to donors,
why would a donor consider using a § 501 (c)(4) social welfare organi-
zation instead? Miller's article makes a persuasive case to a donor like
Jeff Bezos. As noted earlier, Bezos may be indifferent to the charitable
income deduction because it would not save him all that much in
taxes. In addition, a social welfare organization would allow Bezos to
achieve flexibility in grantmaking and leeway for some private bene-
fit; tax-free diversification without having to realize gain on his gifts
of highly appreciated Amazon stock; and avoidance of those nasty
private foundation rules. He would not even be required to file an
application for tax-exempt status on Form 1024 (although he probably
still should). A social welfare organization must only give notice of its
intention to operate as such within 60 days after its formation.21 Even-
tually, it must file annual returns on Form 990, which does not reveal
to the public some of the information (e.g., identity of donors and
specific investments) required by Form 990-PF filed by private
foundations.
Miller notes a key development that opened the door to even hav-
ing this discussion-the enactment in 2015 of § 2501(a)(6), which
provides that gifts to § 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations,
§ 501(c)(5) labor and agricultural organizations, and § 501(c)(6) busi-
ness leagues are not taxable gifts for federal gift tax purposes. Prior to
this legislation, it was unclear whether these types of lifetime gifts
were subject to the gift tax. Thanks to the annual gift tax exclusion,
this was not a problem for small donors. But the gift tax was a great
concern for very wealthy individuals who had used up their lifetime
exemptions or wished to preserve them for later wealth transfers to
their family. This is not the place to revisit this debate or critique the
IRS's capitulation to political pressure when it shut down gift tax ex-
20. This network includes Good Ventures Foundation (a private foundation), Good
Ventures (a supporting organization of the Silicon Valley Community Foundation),
with combined assets of over $1 billion; the Open Philanthropy Project Fund (a do-
nor-advised fund at the Silicon Valley Community Foundation); the Open Philan-
thropy Action Fund (a social welfare organization); and several for-profit LLCs that
engage in social investing. See GOOD VENTURES, http://www.goodventures.org/ (last
visited Jan. 7, 2019).
21. I.R.C. § 506.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
2018]
LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
aminations and essentially gave up the fight.22 It is sufficient to note
that individuals making very large transfers to a § 501(c)(4) organiza-
tion, whether they be for grantmaking or some other permissible social
welfare purpose (such as political advocacy), once risked a big gift tax
bill, diminishing the appeal of the vehicle that Miller's article so ably
promotes.
With the gift tax problem solved, the question became-what
happens when the donor dies, having retained control over his
§ 501 (c)(4) grantmaking entity, or when the donor leaves a large be-
quest to an existing or newly created social welfare organization? The
original draft of Miller's paper presented at the 2017 conference stated
that it is an "open question" whether a bequest to a § 501(c)(4) organi-
zation could qualify for a charitable estate tax deduction. The final
version in this symposium issue leans toward the right answer by con-
cluding that bequests to social welfare organizations "do not appear"
to qualify for an estate tax deduction. Miller also asks whether the
value of the § 501(c)(4) organization's assets will be includible in the
deceased donor's gross estate when, as is the norm, the donor retained
control of the organization throughout his life. As to the first question,
what is the point of all the requirements in § 2055 for an estate tax
charitable deduction if an equivalent tax benefit can be achieved, with-
out any statutory authority, for the same wealth transfer to a social
welfare organization? As to the second question, Miller's article cor-
rectly concludes that the date-of-death value of the entity should be
includible in the decedent's gross estate under § 2036(a)(2). In short,
neither is an open question.
Several suggested workarounds minimize and may eliminate
these estate tax obstacles. First, the donor could step away from any
legal control after funding the § 501(c)(4) grantmaking entity and let
his children or trusted consigliere make all the decisions. The viability
of that solution depends on the family dynamics, but it rarely will
appeal to elders in the generation that created or inherited the wealth.
Alternatively, the donor's estate plan could provide that all the assets
of the § 501(c)(4) organization must be transferred on the decedent's
death to qualified § 501(c)(3) public charities (would the donor fam-
ily's private foundation also be an option?), thus qualifying for an es-
tate tax charitable deduction.
22. For an excellent history and analysis, see Ellen P. Aprill, Once and Future Gift
Taxation of Transfers to Section 501(c)(4) Organizations: Current Law, Constitu-
tional Issues, and Policy Considerations, 15 N.Y.U. J. LGIS. & PuB. POL'Y 289
(2012). See also Miller, supra note 6, at 480-91.
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If these maneuvers solve the estate tax problem (the better view
is that they do), the question remains whether they undercut the over-
all appeal of the § 501(c)(4) grantmaking alternative. As noted earlier,
it depends. These solutions may be acceptable for those donors who
are using § 501(c)(4) organizations to finance robust advocacy of their
political views during their lifetime and are content to shift to a more
traditional charitable vehicle after they die. For others, the charitable
giving alternatives discussed earlier in this commentary may be a bet-
ter overall choice for family harmony, discipline, and continuity.
HI.
FOREIGN SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS
Part H of Miller's article asks if a donor who is indifferent to the
charitable income tax deduction might do even better by using a for-
eign social welfare organization for grantmaking. This can only be
answered by slogging through an intricate web of international tax
rules, all well within Miller's considerable range of expertise. It has
been said that a little knowledge can be dangerous. For this commen-
tator, a generalist's perspective can be liberating, providing the free-
dom to ask a few big picture questions without getting too stuck in the
weeds.
The first asserted advantage of a foreign social welfare organiza-
tion is that it is even more tax efficient than its domestic counterpart,
since the foreign organization avoids any unrelated business income
tax exposure if it borrows to buy a taxable bond. We can thank the
"portfolio interest exemption" for this. A domestic social welfare or-
ganization, by contrast, would have taxable debt-financed income in
the same scenario, but the cognoscenti know that the unrelated debt-
financed income trap is easily avoided by investing through a foreign
blocker corporation.2 3 In any event, assuming that the organization has
good reasons for its asset allocation and use of leverage, the generalist
with very little specialized expertise pauses to ask: is that all there is?
There must be more before one would go to all this trouble of incorpo-
rating offshore. Escaping the private foundation rules seems to be a
more powerful incentive, but that can be achieved with a domestic
social welfare organization or the more traditional private foundation
avoidance vehicles discussed above.
Another reason to go offshore is to avoid the risk of a change in
U.S. law, such as legislation to impose a tax (e.g., on investment in-
come) on domestic tax-exempt entities. This recently happened when
23. See Miller, supra note 6, at 512.
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Congress decided to tax the investment income of certain large univer-
sity endowments,2 4 and an even broader tax has been suggested else-
where by Miller and others. 25 This hedging against unpleasant things
that could happen in the future may be attractive to some donors, as-
suming they are indifferent to the bad optics that could tarnish their
halo when the donor's offshore meandering is the subject of a front
page story in The New York Times.
For some, the desire for anonymity must be the driving force.
Like its domestic counterpart, the foreign social welfare organization
need not apply for U.S. tax-exempt status. 26 But if the foreign organi-
zation has U.S.-source income, it will be outed by what seems to be a
fairly clear obligation to file annual Form 990 information returns.
Anonymity is still possible but only after navigating through a host of
landmines. To explain how privacy can be maintained, Miller's article
launches its readers into orbit, with a meticulous guide on how to op-
erate a tax-exempt foreign social welfare organization without much
transparency. If the Form 990 filing requirement makes the donor un-
happy, the solution is to ignore it by not filing for three consecutive
years. It then will be reclassified as a taxable social welfare organiza-
tion but apparently not pay much, if any, tax. If the IRS threatens to
impose civil penalties, one must only apologize and file the past due
returns. The IRS then will abate the penalties and the organization
once again will be tax-exempt (but is anonymity then lost?). There are
other risks, most requiring an understanding of anti-abuse provisions
with acronyms like CFC, PFIC, FATCA, and FFI, but these risks are
said to be surmountable.
Miller's article illustrates the type of donor who might choose a
foreign social welfare organization by using a case study of a private
equity manager with a plan to donate his carried interest to a
grantmaking entity. The manager's desire for privacy outweighs any
patriotic duty to file annual Form 990 information returns, and he has
been made aware of the opportunity to pivot to a taxable social wel-
fare organization after three years and the attendant risks and escape
hatches. To avoid estate tax exposure, he will cede control of the so-
cial welfare organization to his children.2 7 Does anybody know a pri-
vate equity manager who will donate a big carried interest and then
immediately cede control of his new grantmaking toy to his children?
24. I.R.C. § 4968.
25. See Miller, supra note 6, at 501; Daniel Halperin, The Tax Exemption Under
LR.C. § 501(c)(4), 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 519, 534 (2018).
26. Miller, supra note 5, at 425.
27. Id. at 433.
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Having explained the benefits to the mega-rich of using
§ 501(c)(4) organizations for grantmaking-not exactly God's work
but a masterpiece of creative lawyering-Miller' s article concludes by
considering the tax policy implications and corrective measures. After
noting again that for some wealthy donors the ability to avoid a taxa-
ble capital gain on a gift of highly appreciated property is more valua-
ble than the charitable deduction, the proposed solution is to treat all
donations of noncash property to any § 501(c) organization, even a
public charity, as a taxable sale.28 Various approaches to reforming
the charitable deduction for gifts of appreciated property have been
debated for years.29 If enacted (which will not happen any time soon),
Miller's proposal would recalibrate the subsidy and dampen whatever
enthusiasm there might be for using § 501(c)(4) social welfare organi-
zations for grantmaking. Insofar as it applies to § 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions, the proposal would alter the tax economics of charitable giving,
especially for lifetime donors to institutions, such as universities, mu-
seums, and § 501(c)(3) grantmakers, that are the most common recipi-
ents of large gifts of noncash property. A more targeted solution
would be to limit the proposed rule to gifts to all § 501(c) organiza-
tions other than charities.
The opportunity for § 501(c)(4) organizations to avoid regulation
and transparency also raises policy concerns. This potential for abuse
suggests the need to reexamine the dichotomy between the strict pri-
vate foundation limits and the less restrictive regulatory regime for
public charities and other § 501(c) grantmakers. The goal would be to
converge the rules to provide limited relief to private foundations,
such as by relaxing some of the harsher features of the self-dealing
restrictions, and by extending the more reasonable private foundation
constraints and disclosure requirements to all § 501(c) grantmaking
entities primarily funded by one family or a narrow group of donors. 30
28. This is currently the rule for gifts of appreciated property to § 527 political
organizations. I.R.C. § 84.
29. See, e.g., Roger Colinvaux, Charitable Contributions of Property: A Broken
System Reimagined, 50 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 263, 318-28 (2013); Daniel Halperin, A
Charitable Contribution of Appreciated Property and the Realization of Built-in
Gains, 56 TAX L. REV. 1, 35-38 (2002).
30. Lloyd Mayer's article in this symposium issue expresses similar concerns and
suggests that Congress consider extending some of the private foundation restrictions
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A more sensible Congress, should one ever materialize, also
might revisit the gift tax exclusion for gratuitous transfers to social
welfare organizations, labor unions, and business leagues. The pur-
pose of the gift tax is to serve as a backstop to the estate tax. The
current discontinuity resulting from the enactment of the § 2501(a)(6)
gift tax exclusion departs from that longstanding principle.
Finally, a more comprehensive approach, favored by a few aca-
demic commentators but opposed by what seemed to be a majority of
those attending the conference, is an environmental remediation plan
to clean up the "dumping ground" by repealing § 501(c)(4) and relo-
cating its hodgepodge village of current inhabitants to other § 501(c)
categories if they are worthy of tax-exempt status and, if not, by treat-
ing them as taxable corporations (or trusts).
3'
CONCLUSION
David Miller's open letter to Jeff Bezos adds value by describing
an additional "one-stop shopping" option for his grantmaking and ex-
plaining all the rewards and risks. Whether a § 501(c)(4) social wel-
fare organization turns out to be a good fit depends on Mr. Bezos's
goals, including how much he would benefit from a charitable income
tax deduction, the scope and scale of his philanthropy, his estate plan,
and how he weighs factors such as privacy, transparency, and his fam-
ily's public image. This commentary serves as a second opinion for
him and others in the small group of mega-donors. Most of them, and
the more typical multimillionaire families next door, likely will con-
clude they are just as well served by one or a combination of tradi-
tional grantmaking and for-profit vehicles that have withstood the test
of time.
to § 501(c)(4) organizations that are unable to satisfy any of the grounds (e.g., broad
public support) for escaping private foundation classification if they were exempt
under § 501(c)(3). See Mayer, supra note 4, at 474-75.
31. Compare John D. Colombo, The I.R.S. Should Eliminate 501(c)(4) Organiza-
tions, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (May 15, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/201 3/05/15/does-the-irs-scandal-prove-that-501 c4s-should-be-elimina
ted/the-irs-should-eliminate-501c4-organizations, with Doug Mancino, Don't Elimi-
nate 501(c)(4) Exemption, N.Y. TIMFS: ROOM FOR DEBATE (May 15, 2013), https://
www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/201 3/05/15/does-the-irs-scandal-prove-that-501c
4s-should-be-eliminated/dont-eliminate-501c4-exemption.
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